

**On The Principal
Prerequisites
for A Liberal Democracy**

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. ALL POWER TO NOBODY3
II. THE DANGER OF ENTROPIC DEGENERATION OF DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS7
III. RESTITUTION OF DEMOCRATIC CONSCIOUSNESS11
IV. NOTES16

LI 247/91



I. ALL POWER TO NOBODY

The notion democracy implies, firstly a method of selecting people for leading positions in a political community (1). A particular feature of the method consists of competition of those seeking the positions, with the competition based on pledges of profit and benefits to those willing to follow, and to lend support to a particular candidate or political party. The arbitrator in competition among individuals usually representing parties - politically active organized minorities - is the non-organized majority of politically non-active citizens. A feature characteristic of democracy is that the competition of organized minorities and/or individuals, is not a single action, but rather the democratic procedure presumes an incessant formation of coen, competing minorities whose behaviour is governed by the "rule of anticipated response", that is, by anticipation of the voters' behaviour in the next elections.

However, democracy is not a mere procedure of selection, it is also the result of the realization of the procedure in the political life of society, that is, it is a form of that life. Seen from this point of view, democracy can be characterized as a system of social standards and traditions guaranteeing rights and liberties of the individual in relation to state power, similar to the rights and liberties of minorities in relation to the exercise of power of the ruling majority. The standards and traditions of a democratic policy set a standard for the exercise for the political power - in its standard form, political power acts as a limited (in relation to individuals and minorities), dispersed, controlled one, exercised according to the principle of rotation of political leaders (2). The basic principle of democratic standardization of political power can be expressed by the slogan "all power to nobody", which expresses more explicitly the essence of democracy than the oft-misused and discredited slogan "all power to the people". The production and reproduction of democracy as a standard-setting system is the aim, end and purpose of the realization of democratic procedures.

Now, what is the specific mechanism creating the limitation and control of political power? The basis of the mechanism is the existence of common and deep-rooted democratic traditions: a society living by these traditions regards individual freedom, and its associated rights, as the ultimate, social, political and moral value. Related values such as tolerance, respect for the individual, willingness to discuss and compromise, participation in public activities, openness in accepting new ideas and new ways of behaviour, etc., are generally accepted and materialize in every-day life within democratic traditions.

This system of values is the product of liberal capitalism (3), whose basic principle is a minimization of political power

and simultaneous accentuation of individual freedom to action, which is most markedly expressed in freedom of enterprise. This is the principle of laissez-faire, laissez-passer under which the state is assigned only the role of the "night watchman". The substantial reduction of the role of the state in the economy (at the same time, in religion, fine arts, etc.) under the conditions of liberal capitalism prompts the emergence of a de-politicized civil society in which interaction between individuals is not effected by political power, but is a dialogue between free, equal, and full-fledged partners. The depoliticization of civil society and, consequently, the creation of a democratic tradition, correlates with one of the most specific features of capitalism: political power ceases to be the only way of winning a fortune and prestige. In a society with advanced democratic traditions, observance of the civil rights and liberties of the individual is constantly monitored and controlled by opposition minorities, in case the group in power elected by the majority of voters has breached civil rights and liberties, and the opposition makes this fact generally known (4), the group in power loses its moral legitimacy not only in the eyes of the suppressed opposition but, also, in the eyes of those who had elected it. For a citizen reared in a democratic tradition, preservation of individual liberties and rights is a value superior to the profit generated when the ruling party, defending his interests, suppresses the rights of members of the opposition. The citizen knows well that a government confronting the opposition in such a manner may as well confront him in the same fashion, thus curbing his rights - and he therefore votes for the opposition defending the principle of liberty and inalienable rights of the individual. Needless to say, the opposition, by standing up for recognized values, realizes its own ambitions for power, however, it is obvious that, under the conditions of democracy, a certain party can rise to power only by defending and pushing for generally held values, the rights of the free individual being the most important. Democracy as a socio-political value is the Hegelian "die Sache selbst", reproducing itself on the basis of "trick of the reason" ("List der Vernunft"), hence, democracy is strong if the process of the its reproduction involves mutually neutralizing power ambitions, which may materialize only on the condition their banner contains the sacred word "democracy".

The essential association of reason and democracy was also suggested, in a most inspirational and, in our philosophy, not yet enough appreciated manner, by Karel Čapek: "Democracy is a method for putting irrational factors on a rational resultant by coordinating and controlling it. It does the same job as the intellect does with our experience, emotions and motives: it treats them as objects that can be compared and controlled ... Democracy like the intellect, is hesitation between alternatives,

it is not endowed with the steadfast bias of the instinct, it encompasses control, criticism and correction ...

Democracy, like the intellect, is a endless process of objectivization. In this, it follows the general line of the "human spirit" (5).

In Čapek's vision, democracy is an institutionalized critical intellect whose function is objectivization of contradictory and often irrational subjective interests of individuals and groups within society, the ultimate goal being the realization of objective society-wide interests.

It is characteristic for a democratic system that the objectivized "tricky" reason acting on the basis of the general validity and social respect for the individual's rights as the ultimate value, makes the party in power materialize its interests in a way other than by curbing the democratic rights of the opposition: in a democratic society, the ruling party realizes its interests through transformation of the basic legal limits within which the free individual may act. Democracy makes it impossible for the political power to be directed both against specific individuals and a specifically defined minority. Thus, the political activity becomes an abstract generality. This feature of a democratic society is expressed by the famous principle of the Rule of Law under which general law is absolutely superior to any arbitrary power of the government. The principle of the Rule of Law prevents the government from curbing individual efforts and individual freedom ad hoc. If there exist known general laws, the individual is free to materialize his personal goals and ambitions since he is certain the power of the government will not be arbitrarily used to thwart his endeavour (6). Application of the principle of the Rule of Law expresses the utmost possible measure of the minimization of political power. Under the Rule of Law, limitization and minimization of power endlessly reproduce themselves in the contention of rival parties pursuing their own particular interests, however, the contention takes place on the basis of general respect for the rights of individual as the ultimate value.

Thus, in a democratic system, the relationship between the ruling majority and opposition minority is, in the first place, one of a concensus over general issues, and, only secondarily, in a mediated manner, through creation of general laws, one of the supression of political power. Any decision (legislative measure) adopted by the majority must, under democratic conditions, provide the minority with an opportunity to live and flourish, even though not exactly in the manner the latter may wish to. Each political party must develop a programme for the entire society, not only with respect to its particular interests. The mission and task of the democratic politician is to harmonize the interests of the majority and minority on the basis of generally applicable values. It is from this point of view that democracy

seems to be an institutionalized art of compromise (7).

Of course, the notions "institutionalization of the reason", and "institutionalization of a compromise" do not imply the limitation of direct power in a democratic system to work within the above institutions purely automatically. Even the most sophisticated system of the division of power becomes formalized provided it is not based on democratic consciousness, that is, democratic values consciously held by citizens. For a democracy not to degenerate into totality or a crypto-totality (a tendency toward degeneration and corruption of power inherent to any -crasy, hence also democracy), it is therefore crucial to have living, vigilant consciousness of all citizens, a consciousness consistently guarding the inviolability of the democratic rights and liberties of the citizen. Once the consciousness has ceased to respond to any case of infringement of these liberties, the democracy necessarily starts to degenerate - first, into the form of crypto-totalitarian manipulation and, later, into the form of overt totality.

Hence, if democratic institutions are not revided by a living democratic spirit, they tend to give in - like all non-living beings - to the rule of entropy manifested by the alienation of these institutions from their mission and goal, and their formalization and, consequently, transformation into a disguise of manipulation and totalitarian practices. The use of the term "entropy" in this particular case is not a mere metaphor, since the democratic system of division, limitation and dispersion of power is - as the ultimate creation of the political and cultural evolution of humanity - a dynamic structure. Democracy's measure of probability is by far lower than the measure of probability of political structures based on unlimited power coercion, which is a continuation of the natural entropic tendency in human society. The will to rule, constantly eroding, formalizing and voiding democratic institutions, thus effects transition from a state with a lower probability to a state with a higher probability, that is to say, it effects an entropic process, even though it is a conscientious purposeful activity in itself. Democratic consciousness and practical actions resulting therefrom are a negentropic counter measure against this - however evident or only latent it may be - entropic action of the will to rule. Democracy may work only as an endless conflict of the entropic tendency with the tendency to negentropy, hence, it materializes as a contained destruction of itself.

The sheer existence of democratic institutions objectivizing the trick of (political) reason is therefore not the only a necessary precondition for the working and reproduction of democracy, only a combination of this precondition and the real existence of conscious democratic values or an applicable democratic ideal, a moral ideal, creates a sufficient precondition for democracy. While democracy necessarily presumes

mutual limitation of conflicting power interests, it would be wrong to reduce it merely to this contention of counterbalancing egoisms. The political ideal of democracy must therefore be also formulated as a moral ideal. Non-alienated and non-formalized democracy is unthinkable without moral commitment, without a constantly present appraisal and action "sub specie aeterni", to use the famous statement by Masaryk. It is in this context that one must accept the legitimacy of Masaryk's postulate in which the ethical contents of a democratic ideal must be based on the ultimate moral values of humanity: "Ethically, democracy is a justified a the political materialization of being good neighbours" (8). (The same is true - of course, with certain limitations - for the way the current capitalist economic system works: Smith's "invisible hand" /the trick of economic reason/ is but a necessary precondition for an effective working of the system. It is only a combination of the "invisible hand" with a measure - invariably as minimal as possible - of state regulation of the economy that creates a sufficient precondition. ("Sub specie aeterni" in this particular case is the intervening state thereby creatin the long-term interests of the system as a whole.)

The moral ideal of democracy is an ideal always materializing only incompletely, as it must overcome its omnipresent contradiction, the will to power: "We shall not consider democracy an attained ideal state, but an eternal task just as knowledge is as eternal task" (9). However, it should be pointed out that democracy is not a regulative idea, as defined by Kant, i.e., an idea represented by anything in reality and merely regulating and steering our activities. Even incomplete materialization of the moral democratic ideal is tantamount to real political democracy, it is something that can be distinctly and sharply distinguished from non-democracy and totalitarianism.

II. THE DANGER OF ENTROPIC DEGENERATION OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

The danger stems especially from the fact that, in practice, democracy is materialized in the form of a system of political parties. The weight and importance of political parties in a democratic republic are so heavy that some theoreticians think it absolutely justified to refer, when speaking about a democratic system, to a partycracy, implying the transition of political power from the hands of the government and parliament into the hands of political parties. The inner organization of political parties, however, is often oligarchic (10). (with the oligarchic nature manifesting itself especially in the crypto-totalitarian manipulation practices of party committees) while, as a rule, the closer the inner organization of parties to a totalitarian arrangement, the weaker the democracy emerging

in the power struggle of the parties involved (Michels' "iron rule of oligarchy").

This rule is most marked in coalition politics when (public or less public) agreements between parties practically eliminate competition among major political parties. This gives rise to a power monopoly or, more appropriately, to a cartel, that is, to a crypto-totalitarian structure whose power position is particularly strong especially in a situation when the opposition is so weak or scattered that it cannot pose a threat to the coalition. A fitting description of some aspects of the way this type of crypto-totalitarian power structures work was provided by the witty critic of the political life of the first republic, Karel Capek, on the basis of his own (bitter) political experience in the period of the rule of an aristocratic coalition: "We are humiliated by the indignity of a parliament settling even state necessities by party tradeoffs... I shall support your issue if you give support to mine, I shall vote in favour of this state necessity if you vote in favour of introducing a duty on stocks or in favour of state reimbursement of cooperative deficits. It is a genuine trade-off, this and that matter is given consent since another advantage is being sought... We, who are not politicians, at the same time only misunderstand why voting comedies and parliament shows are arranged for trade-offs like this, since it would be sufficient for the party leaders to have, instead of members of parliament, a corresponding number of counters in their pockets (...) throwing them on the green cloth at the right moment (...). If we need anything, then we have to stand up against parties, against the rule of parties, against the voting machinery, against incompetence, against politics behind the closed door, against the omnipotence of executive committees, against our humiliation, against the decline of democracy..." (11).

Under the conditions as described by Capek, the most vigilant democratic consciousness is too weak a counterbalance to crypto-totalitarian tendencies, since the relationship of competition among parties, which constitutes a real basis on which democratic conscience may act, is eliminated in such a situation.

A real counterbalance to this type of degeneration of a democratic system is what is called participation democracy, as the materialization of direct, non-partisan democracy at different levels. Participation democracy provides the citizen with as many opportunities as possible to participate in decisions affecting his life.

Participation democracy, of course, is not a cure-all (its status, for instance, makes the controversy, present in any type of democracy -- i.e., the controversy between the need for professional technical management of society, which is in essence exclusive, and the equally necessary need for public democratic

control of management processes -- even deeper), it may at most act as a corrective against crypto-totalitarian tendencies of a thriving partyocracy. However, a participation democracy can play its role only on the basis of an advanced and effective system of political parties. At a time of transition from totalitarianism to an open society when the system of parties is still not sufficiently developed, although participation democracy may play a most important part during revolution, later - especially under the conditions of economic reforms - it may become the medium for social demagogy and all kinds of manipulations.

It should be emphasized, in connection with the issue of the decay and degeneration of democracy, that the totalitarian movements of fascism and communism attained their success especially thanks to the fact that - while criticizing the shortcomings and imperfection of democracy - they questioned freedom of the individual as the ultimate socio-political and moral value, thus upsetting the neat mechanism of the limitation and spread of political power involved in the contention of government and its opposition. The consequences were to be seen soon - the voiding of democratic rights of the suppressed minority was followed by voiding of democratic rights within the suppressing majority. The main role in questioning liberal values is played, in the case of fascism as well as in the case of communism, by the so-called treason of the intelligentsia. A certain part - and not a small one - of the intelligentsia lent its education and capabilities to the devastating action of the ideological destruction of the most important social value of modern man.

Now, let us again read a witty remark by Karel Capek "... there are views, slogans and manners that the learned man cannot accept unless he descends from the spiritual level imposed by education, that he shall betray the discipline, the criticism and the intellectual freedom, the inherited cultural experience which are the goal proper of education. There are many public views and practices which would generally and obviously seem to be mean and uncivilized, should people be assigned and socially entrusted with a certain level of education and knowledge, refuse to second them ... "

"It is not in the interests of the intelligentsia or the others to impair the hierarchy giving a priority to spiritual values over anything else. This is not in the interests of the intelligentsia since it destroys its spiritual primogeniture, it is not in the interests of the other walks of life, since a culturally balanced intelligentsia ceases to fulfill certain duties on which the bulk of values of a superior order depend. I shall put it in this way: should culture fail, the "average" man, the simple and ordinary man, the farmer, the worker, the craftsman with his commonsense and moral code, shall not have a say and, instead, something deep beneath him, a barbarian and

violent element starting to play havoc with the civilized world will be brought to life ... Prospero outweighs Caliban. Just cancel the hierarchic superiority of the spirit and you shall pave the way for the return of savages. A decline of the intelligentsia is a way to barbarization of all." (12)

Democracy is thus associated, by a fatal bond, with the intelligentsia, with the implication being that the intelligentsia also holds maximum moral responsibility for the fate of democracy. The idea of this responsibility was explicitly expressed by T.G.Masaryk: "It is just by his profession and status that a member of the intelligentsia, rather than anybody else, can and must take note of the intricate and dramatic synergy and contention of interests, forces, tasks and pitfalls making up society, a state and, after all, the whole of our world. It is exactly for this reason that if I encounter political blindness or indifference in a member of the intelligentsia, that I must apply more stringent criteria than in a man whose interests are more specific."

Masaryk has an equally clear-cut perspective of the cause of failure or treason of the intelligentsia: "it is especially a juvenile effort to materialize the ideal in its absolute perfection and the consequent inability to come to terms with the necessary shortcomings of democracy. It is from this lack of gentleness (13) which is, in the case of our intelligentsia due to the low measure of spiritual aristocratism and overall plebeianism, that gives rise to other weaknesses of the intelligentsia: ... an intolerant and impractical dogmatism, worked-up radicalism, mild opportunism and bored apathy" (14). These weaknesses also have a most adverse bearing on the status of democratic consciousness.

According to F.A.von Hayek it is not a mere lack of culture or an error that is responsible for treason by the intelligence: the factor to be blamed is the inner identification of a certain proportion of the intelligentsia with the idea of totalitarianism, implying total (deliberated and rational) political management of society, it is within the framework of a planning reason (or "reason") pushed for by power, that these intellectuals are provided an opportunity to make use of their ability to rationally construct reality.

Hayek's criticism of constructivist rationality might seem to contrast with the above characteristics of democracy as an objectivized reason. However, the contradiction is only illusory: democracy as an objectivized reason arises and materializes in the form of unconscious components of human activity, democratic consciousness is at the same time aimed at conservation, reproduction and improvement of what has emerged and is emerging in that unconscious activity. Constructivist rationality is destructive for democracy because it puts, in place of an unconsciously-emerged objectivized reason, its subjective

constructions which are invariably - as much as the constructors are unaware of it - an expression of only a partial, particular, subjective interest. Constructivist rationality becomes destructive at the very moment when it pretends to be the general will and starts asserting itself by totalitarian means, while suppressing all interests and approaches not conforming with it. The result is the destruction of objective reason and installation of totalitarian subjectivism.

III. RESTITUTION OF DEMOCRATIC CONSCIOUSNESS

Ideological destruction of the democratic consciousness birthed by liberal capitalism is a process with a very low measure of reversibility, and this especially so in a case when the ideological overture is followed by the installation of a totalitarian regime resulting in cumulative degeneration of all societal values. In totalitarian practice, the values turn out to be lies and a sheer disguise of the exercise of brutal power. Totality results in the homo duplex whose existence is split into two distinctly separated spheres - a private, and a societal one, with the societal sphere of human existence constituting itself as a domain of alienation and immorality.

Even though restitution of the validity of democratic values is the chief motive of dissident elites and sympathetic walks of life, historical practice shows that a totalitarian system can often be defeated by exclusively totalitarian means. Restitution of a consciousness of democratic values is a demanding and painful process, since consistent application of democratic principles frequently leads to the victory of well-organized adherents to totalitarianism, and to a slowing and discreditation of the drive towards democracy. The most drastic, and the most effective, therapy - a total moral shock of society after a lost war and subsequent occupation by a foreign army - a therapy that has apparently cured West Germans once for all from totalitarian mentality, is not thinkable in today's Europe.

It should be remembered that the shaping of consciousness of democratic values is a civil and cultural process lasting something on the order of hundreds of years (however, on the medium of liberal capitalism). Hence, one can assume that a general restitution of democratic consciousness in post-totalitarian societies will not start unfolding until the end of the infernal period of a primary accumulation of capital which, perhaps, will not be, in its historical reprise, as cruel as its premiere (however, it will be all the more so demoralizing), nor will it unfold until and after prolonged stable performance of liberal capitalist economy. One cannot learn from history, history can only repeat itself.

If we examine democracy in connection with the issue of individual liberty, then further examination must necessarily

address the second constitutive aspect of democracy - that of equality. People who are accustomed to reading or hearing slogans such as "Liberte, Fraternite, Egalite" often fail to realize that two basic constitutive aspects of democracy - freedom and equality - have a conflicting and a dramatic interaction (15). Any equality among people, who are inherently unequal and different, is but an abstract equality which may exist as real (institutionalized) equality only through political coercion. Institutionalized equality is in any case a limitation to individual freedom and, hence, its contrast. (Nietzsche vehemently pointed to this fact as early as a century ago thus becoming one of the great destructors of European democratic culture). Still, the idea of democracy presumes equality since institutionalized inequality in political relations would of necessity lead to lack of freedom. For both the theory and practice of democracy, the chief task is to define and accomplish a harmonious relationship between its two constitutive aspects: freedom and equality.

When tackling this task, two forms of democracy may arise: 1) Liberal democracy (16) considers freedom as the ultimate value, while perceiving equality, in relation to freedom, as an inferior value, equality in liberal democracy is reduced to a minimal possible measure, that is, to equality of the right to vote. Liberal democracy especially limits equality lest the major pars (major part) should outweigh the melior pars (best part). The basic liberal democratic formula reads as follows: everybody should stand an equal chance to become unidentical. Equality is perceived as a reciprocal compensation of inequality (17).

It should be stressed in this context that the freedom making up the basis of liberal democracy is, in the first place, a so-called negative freedom, that is, "freedom from" (something), implying especially freedom from external power coercion, so-called positive freedom, "freedom to" (something), freedom as power is in the liberal concept, determined by negative freedom, in the sense that any positive freedom of an individual results from his negative freedom, with the limit to the positive freedom of an acting individual existing in respect to the negative freedom of other individuals. The relationship between negative and positive freedom is expressed by the well-known phrase "the freedom of one man ends where the freedom of another man begins". Of course, this "freedom from" does not encompass "freedom from" generally valid laws formulated within the principle of the Rule of Law.

2) Another form is so-called totalitarian democracy (18) (the notion was coined by J.B.Talmon) in which the aspect of equality suppresses that of freedom (19). This concept of democracy which, due to its impracticality, remains in the realm of sheer theory, is based on some aspects of the learning of J.J.Rousseau, especially on his concept that all citizens must give up all their freedom for the benefit of the general will. Rousseau's

procedure is intended to blunt the differences arising from the unequal measure of freedom in each individual, thus laying the ground for an identical attitude to general well-being. The extreme expression of the idea of a totalitarian democracy can be found in theoretical concepts of Utopian socialism and communism which, according to Tocqueville, represent "equality in poverty and slavery". (Unlike these theoretical concepts, real socialism created a monstrous system of political inequality paralleling the caste system). The criticism by K.Marx of the abstract formal equality of "bourgeois" democracy, and his demand for specific economic equality as a materialization of democracy, make him a leading representative of the totalitarian concept of democracy (20).

Another prominent feature of the totalitarian concept of democracy is the postulate under which general well-being (that is, the societal structure optimal for the society as a whole) can and should be installed through deliberate power, this act of power should and must be directed with maximum effort and effect against those who put their private interests over general interests thus endangering general well-being (and, after all, theirs as well). The idea of creating general well-being through power is based on the idealist presumption that political representation will not misuse the absolute power delegated to it against those who have delegated it, and on the equally idealist (rationalist) presumption that the general will is perfectly identifiable before its materialization. (However, perfect identifiability of general will is confined - even according to Rousseau - only to some individuals or a small elite (21), e.g., the communist party, the basis of totalitarian democracy - maximized equality - thus becomes maximized inequality).

As a result, totalitarian democracy cannot be a real, genuine democracy, it is but a mere sound, a name which, however, can be employed as - thanks to the generally undestandable humanitarian meaning associated with it - an ideological illusion disguising, and hence enabling, the working of the most monstrous totalitarian structures (22). Thus, there is no genuine democracy apart from liberal democracy. (While antique democracy was close to the totalitarian model of democracy, one should not forget the fact that submission of the Greek citizen to the laws of the polis did not pose an infringement of his individuality, that is, lack of freedom, since in those days, the distance between the individual and society, as understood in Modern Age, did not exist.) If, then, liberal democracy ceases to exist, democracy as such ceases to exist, the implication is that all that has been stated in the previous text, about the workings of democracy in general, applies in fact to the workings of liberal democracy. Here, perhaps it would be appropriate to ask why the term liberal democracy has not been used since the very beginning of the discourse. The main reason for employing the term "democracy" is

that exclusive use of the notion "liberal democracy" would suggest the real existence of a type of democracy other than liberal democracy. The term "liberal democracy" is but a deeper, more specific expression of the same reality that is usually referred to as "democracy" to explore the most fundamental features of a genuine, truly existing democracy.

A basic specific feature of a liberal democracy as a real democracy is that - unlike the chimeric totalitarian democracy - its working does not require any ideal prerequisites. A liberal democracy counts on the erroneousness of human knowledge and, also, on the bestial instinctiveness of man who keeps on trying to break through the thin cover of civilized habits. Liberal democracy does not give space to the fatal arrogance (23) of intellectual reason which believes itself capable of perceiving absolute good and exterminating, under this pretext, all those opposing this good. Liberal democracy thus puts a limit on and disperses, deliberate power, since it is within this power that the bestiality concealed in man makes itself most manifest. The system of liberal democracy is therefore most adequate to the truly human essence of man - it maximizes limitations on instinctive, blind, animal will to power. Cancellation of liberal democracy is thus tantamount to an alienation of man from his human essence which is the ultimate creation of history.

Liberal democracy is a constitutive principle by which the *societas hominis sapiens* abide. The minimization of political action in a liberal democracy represents the ultimate feat of human culture, i.e. a maximum degree of its de-naturalization. In spite of all the imperfections and shortcomings, liberal democracy constitutes a way of administering common issues unparalleled by any other inventions in the past and, apparently, in the future. It is therefore the ultimate and, hence, as proposed in a neoHegelian spirit by F.Fukuyama (24), also the end of history. Fukuyama's concept which, of course, does not anticipate an arrest of the flow of time, the disintegration and fall of communist regimes we are currently witnessing, points to the fact that communism is not a positive continuation of the development of civilization, but a descent from the peak of civilization previously attained. An advance of civilization in communist societies is thus possible as a (very difficult) return back to the peak from which, under the influence of Utopian false consciousness in combination with the very realistic and non-Utopian political practice of revolution, they have descended.

Communist societies rejecting liberal democracy and, hence, the minimal possible measure of political coercion of man by man, while adopting massive totalitarianism that submits a civil society to political power structures, have in fact returned to structural forms of pre-capitalist communities. However, modern totality - unlike those communities - does not have at its

disposal such (chiefly spiritual) correctives that might effectively curb the devastating and irrational orgy of absolute power. This is also the main reason why modern totalitarian societies either cease to exist or find themselves on the verge of destruction - with the price for failed social experiments of total power being tens of millions of murdered and tortured human beings.

An alternative between a feasible and real liberal democratic principle to minimize power (which is, at the same time, the principle of minimizing activity of constructivist societal reason), and the totalitarian democratic Utopian idea of a combination of absolute power, absolute reason and absolute good, the alternative faced for such a long period by European and non-European humanity, has ceased - after the terrible experience of a terrible 20th century - to exist.

IV. NOTES

- 1) Compare Giovanni Sartori, *Democratic Theory*, New York 1965, p. 124
- 2) Ditto, pp. 181-182
- 3) Compare J. Roland Pennock, *Democratic Political Theory*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey 1979, p. 514
- 4) Compare Theodor Geiger, *Demokratie ohne Dogma*, Szczesny Verlag, Muenchen 1964, p.328
- 5) Karel Capek, *Spisy XIX., O umění a kultuře III* (Collected Work XIX. On arts and culture III - in Czech), Prague 1990, p. 517
- 6) Compare F.A.von Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom*, Chapter 6
- 7) Sartori, copy of citation, p. 224
- 8) Karel Capek, *Spisy XX., Hovory s T.G.Masarykem* (Collected Work XX. Discussions with T.G.Masaryk - in Czech), Prague 1990, p.517
- 9) Karel Capek, *O umění a kultuře*, p. 592
- 10) According to the known theoretician of democracy, Michels, the tendency to an oligarchic nature is inherent to any organization. Compare Sartori, copy of citation, p. 122
- 11) Karel Capek, *Spisy XIV. Od člověka k člověku I* (Collected Work XIV. From Man to Man - in Czech), Prague 1988, pp. 526-534
- 12) Karel Capek, *O umění a kultuře III.*, pp. 536-537
- 13) Masaryk refers to gentlemanliness as one of the most desirable qualities of the intelligentsia. Karel Capek *Hovory s T.G.M.*, p. 410
- 14) Karel Capek, *Hovory s T.G.M.*, p. 513
- 15) Compare F.A.von Hayek, *Droit, Legislation et Liberte*, Vol.2, Fresses Universitaires de France 1976, pp. 96-106
- 16) Sartori, copy of citation, pp. 354-355
- 17) Ditto, pp. 344-346
- 18) Ditto, pp. 377-378
- 19) Compare Pennock, copy of citation, p. 13
- 20) Compare von Hayek, *Droit ...*, p. 100
- 21) Compare Pennock, copy of citation, p. 106, Sartori, copy of citation, p. 296
- 22) Compare Sartori, copy of citation, p. 378
- 23) Compare F.A.von Hayek, *The Fatal Conceit*, The University of Chicago Press 1988, Chapter 5.
- 24) Compare Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?", *The National Interest* No. 16 (Summer 1989): 4-5

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